I extend my compliments to Professors Ball and Foster for undertaking a tremendous task. Just reading this literature, which amounts to 180 papers, is a staggering job. Moreover, putting together a reasonable structure to organize and d iscuss the material is a subtle and difficult undertaking. Commenting on the resulting paper is also difficult. Unfortunately, receiving the paper only a week ago prevented me from reviewing the underlying literature-a task necessary to a detailed comment. Therefore, my comments are fairly general.
our hypothetical student a map or sketch of the highlands and islands where there is solid footing, the floating clumps which sometimes provide good footing but at other times are treacherous, the deep water holes where little is known, and the quicksand areas which trap the unwary who slip into them. The general tone of the Ball-Foster paper leaves me with a feeling that there is little in the corporate financial reporting literature except deep water and quicksand sprinkled with a few floating clumps of knowledge.
I am reminded of the observer who sees a pessimist entering a room. Almost immediately the pessimist comes out, hands over his nose, loudly exclaiming that the room contains nothing but horse manure. An optimist then enters the room and our observer waits for a similar reaction. Time passes and when nothing happens he carefully opens the door and observes this little fellow knee-deep in horse manure scraping away with his hands. Asked what he's doing, the optimist responds: "I'm looking for the pony.
All this horseshit must mean there's a pony under here somewhere." I think Professors
Ball and Foster could look a little harder for the ponies Unfortunately, the approach taken by Professors Ball and Foster will prevent them from ever concluding that a study is useful or important. They appear to be saying that there is little one can conclude from all this work because each of the studies is imperfect.
That comes perilously close to committing the "more is better" fallacy. In their discussion of the disclosure literature they observe that "more is better" is not a very sensible criteria to apply. Obviously there is an optimization problem. One wants the optimal amount of corporate financial disclosure and one also wants the optimal amount of perfection in a scholarly paper. More bluntly, the optimal number of errors in research papers is not zero, and therefore we shouldn't use the perfection criterion to judge articles or to decide 1982 when to publish them. Professors Ball and Foster seem to adopt a "big bang" theory of research in which nothing is published on a topic until we can jump to perfection all at once. Unfortunately, that is not the way the process works. We teach our capital budgeting students that the optimal time to cut a tree generally occurs before it reaches the maximum height. Similarly, the optimal time to publish an article occurs before it is "perfect". I know of no papers that have proposed and answered all questions in an area-even the pathbreaking contributions to capital structure theory made by Modigliani and Miller (1958 , 1963 , 1966 , to portfolio theory made by Markowitz (1952 Markowitz ( , 1959 , to the efficient market literature made by Harry Roberts (1959) , and to asset pricing theory made by Sharpe (1964) , Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) .
It is interesting that we spend so little time as scientists thinking about the research process as a whole, and this is reflected in the fact that we do not have very good models of the process. As a journal editor, I've become more impressed over time with the necessity to avoid applying standards to individual papers that are best applied to the research process as a whole. I have, for example, published papers with known errors in them even though the authors refused to change the papers because I believed that such publication would stimulate other work on the topic. Furthermore, a paper that simply phrases a new research question appropriately but does not answer it provides a major contribution to a field of inquiry.
Professors Ball and Foster tend to emphasize the complexity and interrelatedness of the world and call for its complete treatment. They seem to emphasize the necessity to take into account multiple principals, multiple agents, multiple periods, costly information, uncertainty, and imperfect markets. However, the essence of good research is to distill those areas of inquiry or those propositions that can "almost" be decoupled from the rest of the world. We then move on to push the limits of knowledge back by relaxing some of the simplifying assumptions and by combining the imperfect lumps of knowledge that emerge as stable sub-systems. The progress over the last 200 years accomplished by partial equilibrium analysis and the failure of so-called "systems analysis" that emphasizes the necessity to take into account all inter-dependencies are examples.
Several decades ago Herbert Simon (1962) , in an important paper entitled "The Architecture of Complexity", proposed that complex systems only arise as hierarchical combinations of sub-systems that are themselves stable. He applies, the principle to production problems, biological and physical systems, mathematics, and organizations.
His arguments also apply to the scientific research process. A good review paper can itself be a stable sub-system in the research process. Fama's (1970) efficient market review paper, Smith's (1976) option pricing review paper and the Lippman-McCall (1976) review paper on search models are good examples that come to mind. A good review paper can provide a sense of history of the development of the area, the false starts, the disputes and their resolutions, and the current state of affairs. To do it is necessary for the authors to use a great deal of selectivity in deciding which papers to review and which to exclude. I would have preferred that Ball and Foster use such selectivity rather than attempt to briefly review everything in the literature.
As an alternative to the Ball and Foster approach, I would suggest a format for a review paper that contains five basic elements: (1) the theory and major hypotheses, (2) the tests, (3) the uncontested results, (4) the inconsistent and contested results, and (5) the major remaining issues. The authors have, of course, done this somewhat for each of their chosen areas-corporate disclosure, accounting method choice, time series analysis, and financial distress analysis. I prefer somewhat more emphasis on the substantive content of the literature, but depending on one's interpretation of the word methodology, that might be inconsistent with the assignment the authors were given. If so, I recommend they simply redefine the word or the assignment.
Let me turn now to some miscellaneous points: (i) Their use of the term "analytical", (ii) the usefulness of tautologies in science, and (iii) separating positive and normative issues. The authors put great emphasis throughout the paper on the value of the "analytical" literature. From their use, I infer they equate "analytical" to "mathematical".
I observe this to be a common phenomenon. People also tend to identify "rigor" with "mathematical". Neither of these links is, of course, correct. Mathematical is not the same as rigorous, nor is it the same as analytical. Logic can be perfectly rigorous without being mathematical, and analysis does not have to take the form of symbols and equations. The English sentence and paragraph will do quite well. Professors Ball and Foster have a theory that the research on corporate financial reporting would be better if it was more "analytical". I understand that to mean "if it was more mathematical". They believe the "analytical" material would be useful to define the hypotheses and to define the variables used in the tests. This is, of course, a testable hypothesis. But they do not phrase it this way, nor do they test it. Moreover, I believe that the hypothesis is incorrect. For example, I recall the labor economics literature of a number of years ago that was characterized by articles with two distinct parts; the first part devoted to a mathematical model and the second part to empirical tests. Quite frequently the second part had little or nothing to do with the first part-for example, variables that never appeared in the mathematical material in the first part of the paper show up in the empirical tests.
Mathematics is very useful, but not universally so. Someti mes its use is simply inappropriate or even counter-productive in the research process. This is especially true in dealing with new areas. A great deal of work has to be done in a new area of analysis before the dimensionality of the problem and the major variables can be defined.
Mathematics seems to be useless for solving these problems. My impression is that attempts to use mathematics at such an early stage in the development of an area are often counter-productive because authors are led to assume the problem away or to define toy problems that are tractable. We can use the Ball-Foster paper itself as an example of the difficulty of this problem. Applying their criteria to their paper implies that they should use mathematics to guide in the selection of the data (i.e., the papers), and mathematics to determine the tests to be performed and the inferences to be drawn. I believe this would be a counter-productive exercise, and I suspect they would agree with me.
I noticed this morning when Ross Watts was speaking that the mention of "tautology" drew snickers from the audience. In addition to the confusion that exists about the difference between analysis, rigor and mathematics, there is also widespread misunderstanding about the importance of tautologies or definitions. I suspect this is partially a result of the emphasis here in the Chicago environment on empirically testable propositions-an environment that I grew up in and benefited from greatly. However, the lack of careful attention to the choice of the tautologies or definitions we use is widespread in the profession. This is unfortunate because the tautologies or definitions that are chosen fundamentally influence one's view of the world. I'm led to think of the 1982 Coase Theorem, the Cambridge equation, the notion of efficient markets, and even utility maximization itself. All are tautologies. All, of course, can be turned into testable propositions with appropriate changes in the definitions and supporting structure. I'm concerned about the education our graduate students get because although we impress on them the distinctions between normative analysis and positive analysis, we spend little or no time at all sensitizing them to the fact that the tautologies we choose are also important. Indeed, they are often left with the impression that to make a tautological statement is a matter of great professional embarrassment. Unfortunately, we have no theory that guides us in our choice of tautologies. Several years ago I asked Milton
Friedman about how to choose between alternative tautologies. His response, I suppose not surprisingly, was that the choice between tautologies is in the end an empirical question Professors Ball and Foster also seem to disapprove of "heuristic notions" as opposed to mathematical analysis as sources of hypotheses. While carefully constructed hypotheses and tests are clearly desirable, brute force empiricism can and does play an important role in science. My colleague and co-editor of the Journal of Financial Economics, G. William Schwert, has convinced me after many discussions that some numbers, facts or relations are interesting to know even though they do not provide tests of any currently known or interesting theory, for example, the average level of market returns and interest rates. This is the complement, I suppose, to the implicit proposition made above that some tautologies or definitions are interesting even though they do not provide any testable or refutable propositions at the current time. I hasten to add, of course, that both the interesting numbers and the interesting tautologies are useful only because they contribute to the development of testable theories that do help us understand the phenomena in the world around us. In that sense, Milton Friedman is right-it is an empirical question.
Finally, Professors Ball and Foster could usefully distinguish between normative and positive issues. For example, in their discussion of the disclosure literature they concentrate their attention on a criticism of the normative content of this literatureprimarily the notion that "more disclosure is better than less". This criterion clearly deserves criticism. It is useful to summarize the effects of different levels of disclosure (unfortunately, they do not do this) and to keep this documentation of the effects separate from the value judgments in the literature regarding the desirability of different levels of disclosure In conclusion, I want to thank the University of Chicago, the Institute of Professional Accounting, and Nick Dopuch and Roman Weil for providing an opportunity for us to get together at what has been one of the most stimulating and interesting conferences that I've attended in a long time.
